Money Is Memory*

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This paper examines the sets of feasible allocations in a large class of economic environments in which commitment is impossible (following Myerson [8], the standard definition of feasibility is adapted to take account of the lack of commitment). The environments feature either memory or money. Memory is defined as knowledge on the part of an agent of the full histories of all agents with whom he has had direct or indirect contact in the past. Money is defined as an object that does not enter utility or production functions, and is available in fixed supply. The main proposition is that any allocation that is feasible in an environment with money is also feasible in the same environment with memory. Depending on the environment, the converse may or may not be true. Hence, from a technological point of view, money is equivalent to a primitive form of memory. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Numbers: E40, C73, D82. © 1998 Academic Press

I. INTRODUCTION

At its heart, economic thinking about fiat money is paradoxical. Fiat money consists of intrinsically useless objects that do not enter utility or production functions. But at the same time, these barren tokens allow societies to achieve allocations that would otherwise not be achievable. The purpose of this paper is to uncover what permits these barren tokens to

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play this role. I show that any allocation that is achievable using money alone could be achieved instead by allowing agents costless access to a historical record of past actions that I term *memory*. I conclude that the role of money is to serve as a (typically imperfect) form of memory.

More precisely, the paper examines a large class of economic environments that includes the setups underlying the overlapping generations, turnpike and random matching models. In all of these environments, agents are unable to commit themselves to a particular allocation of resources; the environments feature either memory or money (but not both together). Following Myerson [8], I define a notion of incentive-feasibility that simultaneously respects the usual physical re-allocation restrictions and the participation restrictions implied by the absence of commitment. The main proposition is that any allocation that is incentive-feasible in an environment with money is also incentive-feasible in the same environment with memory. I show that, depending on the environment, the converse may or may not be true. Hence, in these environments, money is equivalent to a primitive form of memory.

The logic behind this proposition is simple. Given the presence of a historical record, it is possible to construct strategies for agents in any environment with memory that correspond to what happens in an environment with money. In the monetary environment, when an agent gives up resources today, he receives money which can be used to purchase resources next period. Analogously, in an environment with memory, an imaginary balance sheet is kept for each agent. When an individual gives consumption to someone else, his balance rises, and his capacity for receiving future transfers goes up. When he gets consumption from someone else, his balance falls, and his capacity for receiving future transfers declines. In the monetary environment, money is merely a physical way of maintaining this balance sheet.

Others (Ostroy [10], Lucas [7], Townsend [12–14], Aiyagari and Wallace [2]) have noted that, as emphasized in this paper, fiat money helps to keep track of past actions. The contribution of this paper over this past work is to emphasize both the singularity and the generality of money’s recordkeeping role. I show that the expansion in allocations that money allows is completely subsumed by the expansion in allocations that is made possible by just one type of technological innovation: memory. Moreover, I show that this result is true in an extremely broad class of environments.

\footnote{As I do in this paper, Huggett and Krasa [5] use a mechanism design approach to assess when fiat money is “essential” in overlapping generations and turnpike environments. Throughout, they assume that there is no “memory” available to society, and so their focus is considerably different from mine.}
In the next section, I describe the class of environments under study, and show that it nests the standard overlapping generations, turnpike, and random matching models. In Section III, I define memory, money, and incentive-feasible allocations. In Section IV, I prove the main result that the set of incentive-feasible allocations with money is a (possibly improper) subset of the incentive-feasible allocations with memory. Finally, in Section V, I conclude.

II. A CLASS OF PHYSICAL ENVIRONMENTS

In this section, I describe a class of physical environments, and then show that the models underlying the major paradigms of monetary theory belong to this class.

1. General Discussion

In this subsection, I describe a class of physical environments. In each environment, time is discrete, with a finite number $K$ of perishable goods at each date. There is a set of agents indexed by $\omega$, where $\omega$ lies in $\Omega \subseteq [0, 1]$. Different agents can live for different lengths of time. Let $\Omega_t \subseteq \Omega$ denote the indices of agents who are alive at the beginning of period $t$. I assume that $\Omega_t$ either has positive Lebesgue measure, is a countably infinite subset of $[0, 1]$, or a finite subset of $[0, 1]$.

In period $t$, a generic agent $\omega$ has a momentary utility function $u^\omega: R^K \rightarrow [u, \bar{u}]$. All agents have the same discount factor $\beta$. Hence, the generic agent $\omega$, in period $t$, preferences over streams of consumption that are representable by the utility function

$$u^\omega(c_t) + \beta \sum_{r=1}^{T(\omega)} u^\omega(c_{t+r})$$

where $c_{t+r}$ is some element of $R^K$. Here, $T(\omega)$ is the number of years left in agent $\omega$’s life and may be infinity; $E_t$ represents an expectation conditional on information available to the agent in period $t$.

At each date, a generic agent $\omega$ has a nonnegative endowment $y_\omega^m \in R^K$ and a technology $Y_\omega^m \subseteq R^K$ with which to produce more goods. I assume that $0 \in Y_\omega^m$, and that agent $\omega$ can freely dispose of any goods; hence, if $y \in Y_\omega^m$, then $y' \in Y_\omega^m$ for any $y' \leqslant y$. The characteristics of each agent $\omega$ (that is, endowments, preferences, technologies, and birth and death dates) are common knowledge among all agents.

The state of the world is defined by a stochastic process $s$, which determines a date $t$ partition of the agents who are alive at $t$. I term an element
of this partition a match; for technical reasons, it is convenient to assume that each match contains a finite number of agents. The partition determined by \( s_t \) represents both the physical and informational separation of agents: Thus, no transfers of many goods can take place among agents who are in different matches, and agents at \( t \) do not know what happens in other matches at date \( t \). Similarly, the state \( s_t \) is not common knowledge. Rather, at time \( t \), a given agent observes only the indices of all agents in his current and past matches. I assume that \( s_t \) is independent of the past in the sense that \( \Pr(s_t | s_{t-1}, s_{t-2}, \ldots, s_1) \) is the same for all past histories \((s_{t-1}, \ldots, s_1)\) (but note that \( s_t \) may be deterministic and/or nonstationary).

Given the physical separation across matches, the following is a natural definition of feasible allocations.

**Definition 1.** For every match of \( J \) agents at date \( t \), an allocation specifies a \( K \)-dimensional vector \( c^t_j \) for each agent \( j \); an allocation is feasible if, in every match, every component of \( c^t_j \) is nonnegative and \( \sum_{j=1}^J c^t_j - \sum_{j=1}^J y^t_j \in \sum_{j=1}^J Y^t_j \).

The definition of feasibility respects the restriction that there is no way to transfer goods from one match to another.

I make two assumptions about the matching process. First, for any agent \( \omega \), define his autarkic utility within period \( t \) to be:

\[
\omega^t_{\text{aut.}}(c) \equiv \max_{c \geq 0} u^\omega(c) \quad \text{s.t.} \quad (c - y^t_\omega) \in Y^t_\omega.
\]

Then, I assume that the matching process satisfies:

(A1) In any match, there exists no feasible allocation \((c^t_j)_{j=1}^J\) of resources within the match that Pareto dominates autarky in the sense that \( u^t(c^t_j) \geq u^t_{\omega^t} \) for all \( j \), with \( u^t(c^t_j) > u^t_{\omega^t} \) for some \( j \).

As we shall see, this restriction serves to highlight the role of money and memory by essentially eliminating all nonautarkic allocations when they are absent.

I also assume that the matching process has the following feature that ensures a severe informational separation among the agents. Let \( P_t(\omega) \) be the agents who are in agent \( \omega \)'s match in period \( t \) (including \( \omega \) himself), and then define \( Q_t(\omega) \) recursively as

\[
Q_1(\omega) = P_1(\omega)
\]

\[
Q_t(\omega) = \bigcup_{v \in P_t(\omega)} Q_{t-1}(v).
\]
(If $\omega$ is not alive in period $t$, then $P_t(\omega)$ is empty.) Thus, $Q_t(\omega)$ consists of agent $\omega$ and his trading partners in period $t$, all of their trading partners in period $(t-1)$, all of those people's trading partners in period $(t-2)$, and so on. I assume that the matching process satisfies:

(A2) If $v \in P_t(\omega)$, then with probability one, $Q_{t-1}(\omega) \cap Q_{t-1}(v) = \emptyset$.

Assumption (A2) means that agent $\omega$ has no information about agent $v$'s past matches other than that provided by money or memory, because there is no possibility of any direct or indirect contact between the two agents before the current match. Thus, assumption (A2) serves to make as stark as possible the role of money and memory as sources of information about the past.

From now on, I use the term “environment” to refer to an environment as discussed above, in which the matching process satisfies assumptions (A1) and (A2).

2. Examples of Environments

This subsection shows that the class of physical environments studied in this paper embeds the standard paradigms of modern monetary theory.

a. Overlapping Generations

Consider an overlapping generations economy in which every agent lives two periods. There are $J$ agents in each cohort. Agents are each endowed with $y_1$ units of a perfectly divisible good when young and $y_2$ units of the good when they are old; the good is not storable. (Here, technologies are equal to $[y_{y} - y_{0}]$). The young agents have preferences over current consumption ($c_y$) and future consumption ($c_o$) that are representable by the utility function $u(c_y) + u(c_o)$ where $u$ is strictly increasing. The old agents prefer more consumption to less.

Label the agents in each cohort by numbers from 1 to $J$. Then think of the matching process as separating the $2J$ agents alive at each date by partitioning them into pairs consisting of the old agent $j$ and the young agent $j$. The set $Q_{t-1}$ (young agent $j$) is empty, so (A2) is trivially satisfied. Also, it is clear that because there is only one good, (A1) is satisfied.

b. Turnpike

As in Townsend [11], consider a world with an infinite number of trading posts located at the integer points along the real line. In period one and in every period thereafter, at each trading post there are $J$ "stayers" and $J$ "movers." At the end of period $t$, the movers move $2^{t-1}$ trading posts to
the right; the stayers stay at their current trading posts. (The unorthodox size of the shifts is in order to make the matching process consistent with (A2).) The agents in each cohort at each trading post are indexed using the natural numbers from 1 to $J$.

In period $t$, stayers are endowed with one unit of consumption if $t$ is odd and zero units of consumption if $t$ is even; the movers are endowed with zero units of consumption if $t$ is odd and one unit of consumption if $t$ is even. (As above, technologies are equal to $\{ y \mid y \leq 0 \}$. ) Consumption is perishable. In period $t$, each type of agent has preferences over current and future consumption representable by the function

$$
\sum_{s=0}^{\infty} \beta^s u(c_{t+s}), \quad 0 < \beta < 1
$$

where $u$ is strictly increasing, strictly concave, and bounded from above and below.

Suppose the matching process pairs stayer $j$ with mover $j$ at each trading post. Consider the mover $j$ who started life at trading post 0; in period $t$, he arrives at trading post $2^{t-1} - 1$. It is tedious but simple to show that for this agent, $Q_t$ contains all stayers and movers labelled $j$ who began life at posts $\{0, 1, ..., 2^{t-1} - 1\}$. At the same time, the set $Q_t$ for mover $j$ at trading post $(2^{t}-1)$ contains all stayers and movers labelled $j$ who began life at posts $\{2^{t-1}, ..., 2^{t} - 1\}$. Hence, the matching process satisfies (A2). Because there is only one good at each post, the process also satisfies (A1).

c. Random Matching

The following is a simplified version of the environment underlying Trejos and Wright [15]. Consider an environment in which $Q = [0, 1]$; there are three types of agents and there is a measure 1/3 of each type. There are also three types of nondurable, indivisible, nonstorable goods. In each period, a type $i$ agent can produce some nonnegative amount of good $i$ less than or equal to $y$. Type $i$ agents have momentary utility $u(c_{i+1}) - y$, where $c_{i+1}$ is consumption of good $(i+1)$ and $y$ is production of good $i$. (The utility function $u$ is assumed to be strictly increasing and strictly concave.) The agents live forever and discount utility using the discount factor $\beta$.

In the more general notation developed above, we can think of there being four goods: the three perishable goods and time. The endowment vector for each agent has the form $y_t = (0, 0, 0, y)$. A type 1 agent has technology

$$
Y_1 \{ (y_1, y_2, y_3, y_4) \in \mathbb{R}^4 \mid y_1 \leq y_4, y_2 \leq 0, y_3 \leq 0 \}.
$$

Note that the technology satisfies free disposal. The upper bound on production in any allocation is a consequence of a nonnegativity constraint on the agent’s allocation of time.
In this environment, the matching process randomly divides the agents into pairs; a given individual is equally likely to be matched with any of the three types of agents. Note that because \( Q_t(\omega) \) is a set of measure zero for all \( t \) and \( \omega \), condition (A2) is trivially satisfied. Also, the structure of agent preferences and technologies guarantees that condition (A1) is satisfied as well.

III. INCENTIVE-FEASIBLE ALLOCATIONS

In this section, I augment the above physical environments first with money and then, instead, with memory. Having done so, I define no-commitment trading mechanisms, and prove a "revelation principle" that shows that any equilibrium outcome of any no-commitment mechanism is an equilibrium outcome of a particular direct mechanism. I use this result to describe a notion of incentive-feasibility for three types of environments: ones without money or memory, ones with money, and ones with memory.

1. Money and Memory

First, suppose there is another good that is durable that does not enter preferences or production; call this good money. The per capita supply of money is fixed at \( M \) over time. At the end of any period, because of the physical properties of money, any agent’s holdings of this durable good are restricted to lie in the finite set \( \{0, 1/2, 1/3, ..., \} \); I assume that \( 1/2 \) contains \( \{0\} \).

Any agent born after date 1 begins life with zero units of money. The initial stock of money can be distributed across agents in \( \Omega_1 \) (that is, agents alive at the beginning of period 1) in two different ways. The first method specifies a function \( m_0: \Omega_1 \rightarrow \Gamma \) such that the per capita level of

\[ x_t(\omega) \]

is given as follows:

- If \( \Omega_t \) is finite, \( X_t = \frac{\sum_{\omega \in \Omega_t} x_t(\omega)}{|\Omega_t|} \).
- If \( \Omega_t = \{\omega_1, \omega_2, \omega_3, ...\} \), \( X_t = \lim_{j \rightarrow \infty} \sum_{\omega=1}^{j} x_t(\omega) \).
- If \( \Omega_t \) is a subset of \( [0, 1] \) with positive Lebesgue measure, then

\[ X_t = \int_{\Omega_t} x_t(\omega) d\omega. \]

Using per-capita in these different ways is standard. (Note that the last definition implicitly assumes that \( x_t \) is Lebesgue integrable as a function of \( \omega_t \).)
\(m_d(\omega)\) is \(M\). Here, the initial level of moneyholdings for each agent is a deterministic function of his identity.

The second method only works if \(\Omega_1\) is countably infinite or a set of positive Lebesgue measure. Define \(\mu\) to be any measure over \(\Gamma\) such that \(E(\mu) = M\); for each person in \(\Omega_1\), their initial moneyholdings are drawn independently from \(\mu\). The measure \(\mu\) is common knowledge among all agents (not just those alive at the beginning of period 1). Note that both of these methods of distributing money across agents in period 1 imply that an agent has independent (possibly degenerate) priors over his compatriots’ initial moneyholdings.

Just as with the \(K\) perishable goods, allocations of money must obey the physical trading restrictions imposed by the matching process.

**Definition 2.** For every match of \(J\) agents at date \(t\), a money allocation specifies a scalar \(m^t_j\) for each agent \(j\); a money allocation is feasible if, in every match, \(m^t_j \in \Gamma\) and \(\sum_{j=1}^{J} m^t_j \geq \|J\| m^t_j\).

Note that allocations of money also must obey the individual feasibility restriction that individual moneyholdings lie in \(\Gamma\).

Now suppose that instead of adding money, we add memory to the class of physical environments as follows. There is a historical record (spreadsheet) that, for each agent \(\omega\), reports \(\omega\)'s past trading partners at each previous date, and the actions of \(\omega\) and his partners in those matches. Access to the record works as follows: at any date, agent \(\omega\) can costlessly and instantaneously observe the entries in the record for any individual in \(Q_t(\omega)\). However, it is important to note that access is limited in the sense that agent \(\omega\) is unable to observe the entries in the record for any of his potential future trading partners. The reason for this limitation will become clear later.

2. **No-Commitment Trading Mechanisms**

In this subsection, I first give a precise but general description of trading mechanisms (essentially, methods of interactions among the agents that lead to feasible allocations of resources in each match). I then define no-commitment trading mechanisms\(^4\) that can be used by societies that do not have any technology of enforcement.

Trading mechanisms have two components. The first component specifies a sequential choice of actions by the various agents in a match.

\(^4\)My definition of no-commitment trading mechanism is similar to the definition of limited commitment trading mechanisms in Huggett and Krasa [5]. Others have used the term “sequential individually rational” to refer to this class of mechanisms (Aiyagari and Wallace [2]; Green and Oh [4]).
More precisely, suppose agent \( \omega \)'s match in period \( t \) contains \( J \) agents who begin the period with a vector \( \mathbf{m}_{t-1} \) of moneyholdings. Within the period, there are \( \Pi \) subperiods or stages. Each agent \( \omega \) has an action set \( A_\pi(t, \omega, P_\pi(\omega), \mathbf{m}_{t-1}) \) for each stage \( \pi \); in each stage, agents choose actions simultaneously and separately. The actions chosen in stage \( \pi \) are common knowledge among the agents in future stages.

The second component of a mechanism is an outcome function \( f(\mathbf{a}; t, P_\Pi(\omega), \mathbf{m}_{t-1}) \) that, for each vector \( \mathbf{a} \) of agent actions within the previous \( \Pi \) stages, specifies an element of the set of feasible allocations. Agents then receive consumption, produce output, and transfer money according to this allocation.

Note that this notion of trading mechanism allows for a wide range of modes of interactions and, in particular, includes the exchange procedures used in the standard monetary models. In the Trejos-Wright [15] random matching model, virtually any kind of finite stage bargaining protocol (including take-it-or-leave-it offers on the part of the consumer) is a trading mechanism. In the overlapping generations and turnpike models, given that a competitive equilibrium exists, there is a trading mechanism that mimics competitive exchange within each match (even though there are only a finite number of agents). This mechanism has only one stage; the agents' action sets equal their budget sets as calculated using a competitive equilibrium price vector. The outcome function then gives them whatever element of those budget sets that they choose. (Note that the competitive equilibrium price vector, and therefore any budget set, is completely determined by \( t \) and \( \omega \) because these are the sole determinants of endowments, technology and preferences of agents within the match.)

Having defined a trading mechanism in this general fashion, we need to have a notion of equilibrium to know what outcomes can occur when agents follow the rules of play described by the mechanism. Following Abreu, Pearce and Stacchetti [1], I restrict attention to perfect public equilibria (see also Fudenberg and Tirole ([3], pp. 187–188)) in which agents use strategies that do not depend on their private information. I make this restriction for two reasons. First, in most analyses of monetary random matching models, researchers have focused on a subset of perfect public equilibria. Second, because of the restriction (A2) on the matching process and because of the independence of \( s_t \) from past information, an agent \( \omega \)'s best response correspondence in a particular match is always independent of his private information. (This second fact is of course not true if agents have private information about their preferences or technologies.)

To use this equilibrium concept, it is important to distinguish between the public information and private information for each agent. This distinction varies across the three types of environments (no memory or money, with
money, and with memory). For example, in an environment without
money or memory, the public information in a match consists only of the
indices of the agents in the match and any actions taken at previous stages
within the match. An agent's private information consists of the indices of
all agents in his past matches, and the past actions of all agents in his past
matches.

In an environment with money, the public information consists of the
moneyholdings of the agents, their indices, and any actions taken at
previous stages within the match. An individual's private information
consists of past reports he has sent and received, the indices and past
actions of all agents in his past matches and all moneyholdings of all agents
in his past matches. Finally, in an environment with memory, the public
information available to agent \( o \) consists of all actions taken by all agents
in \( Q_t(o) \) in this match and all past matches.

Given these varying notions of information across the various environ-
ments, I formally define strategies, equilibria, and equilibrium allocations
as follows.

**Definition 3.** An agent’s strategy in any environment is a mapping
from all of his possible information sets into actions. A (pure strategy)
perfect public equilibrium (PPE) is a collection of individual strategies such
that

(i) At every information set, an individual's strategy specifies an
action that is weakly optimal given that all agents follow their strategies at
their current and future information sets.

(ii) If an individual has two information sets that only differ in his
private information, his strategy specifies the same action at those two
information sets.

A PPE allocation is one that occurs when all individuals always play the
strategies in a PPE.

It is easy to see that in any environment, the first-best allocation specifies
a split of resources that depends only on the technologies, momentary
utility functions, and indices of the agents within each match. Hence, it is
simple to construct a mechanism that uniquely implements this allocation,
even in environments without money or memory. The mechanism has a
single stage, agents’ action sets are singletons, and the outcome function
maps this unique vector of actions into the desired allocation.

This simple result tells us that societies need to keep track of the past
only if they face some additional friction that interferes with the allocation
of resources. The additional friction that I consider is lack of commitment:
Any agent is allowed to refuse at any point in time to go along with a
proposed allocation and instead simply produce a consumption vector for himself. This means that the society can only use no-commitment trading mechanisms.

**Definition 4.** A no-commitment trading mechanism is one such that in any match, for every agent $\omega$ in the match, and for all $(c^\omega, m^\omega)$ such that $c^\omega \in \{y^T_t\} + Y^T_t$ and $0 \leq m^\omega \leq m^\omega_{t-1}$, there exists an action sequence $a_\omega$ such that the allocation $f(a_\omega, a_{-\omega}^\omega; t, P_t(\omega), m^\omega_{t-1})$ gives $(c^\omega, m^\omega)$ to agent $\omega$ for all $a_{-\omega}^\omega$.

Here, $a_{-\omega}^\omega$ refers to a vector of action sequences by all other agents except $\omega$. Thus, in a no-commitment trading mechanism, an agent $\omega$ always has the ability to choose a sequence of actions that guarantee him a given autarkic consumption vector. Note that there is always an autarkic PPE allocation of a no-commitment mechanism. Also, the class of no-commitment trading mechanisms includes the competitive exchange mechanism and the bargaining protocols mentioned above.

### 3. Incentive-Feasible Allocations

The class of no-commitment trading mechanisms is enormous. Fortunately, in this subsection, I show that we can essentially focus on just one no-commitment trading mechanism: the direct mechanism.

**Definition 5.** The direct mechanism is a trading mechanism in which:

(i) $\Pi = 1$

(ii) $A_t(t, \omega, P_t(\omega), m_{t-1}) = \{(a^\omega_1, a^\omega_2) | a^\omega_1$ is a feasible element of $(\sum_{\nu \in P_t(\omega)} Y^\nu_t \times F) \text{ and } a^\omega_2 \in \{c^\omega_t \geq 0 | (c^\omega_t - y^\nu_t) \in Y^\nu_t \} \times \{m^\omega_t | 0 \leq m^\omega_t \leq m^\omega_{t-1}\}\}$

(iii) $f(a; t, P_t(\omega), m_{t-1}) = a^\omega_1$ if $a^\omega_1$ is the same for all $\omega$ in $P_t(\omega)$

In words, the direct mechanism says that if all agents choose the same allocation of resources, then that allocation is implemented; if they choose different allocations, then autarky is implemented.

Given this definition of the direct mechanism, the following proposition is then a version of the revelation principle (Myerson [8, 9]).

**Proposition 1.** A PPE allocation of any no-commitment trading mechanism is a PPE allocation of the direct no-commitment mechanism.

**Proof.** In what follows, I consider any PPE allocation of some no-commitment trading mechanism.
(i) No Money or Memory
For any trading mechanism, the PPE equilibrium specifies a feasible allocation of resources \(c(t, P_t(\omega))\) in each match as a function of time and of the indices of agents involved in the match. In the direct mechanism, I claim that the following is a PPE:

In any match, all agents in the match choose the same feasible allocation \(c(t, P_t(\omega))\); agent \(\omega\) chooses some element of \(\{y^\text{aut}_t\} + Y^\text{aut}_t\) that delivers momentary utility equal to \(u^\text{aut}_t\).

Suppose some agent chooses a different action in some match. Then, he gets momentary utility less than or equal to \(u^\text{aut}_t\). His future utility is unaffected, because his change will not be reflected in public information in future matches. But \(c(t, P_t(\omega))\) delivers at least as much momentary utility as \(u^\text{aut}_t\), because it is a PPE of a no-commitment trading mechanism.

(ii) Money
Using any trading mechanism, an agent’s continuation utility (after any match) in a PPE depends only on time, his index, and on his moneyholdings. A PPE in any mechanism specifies an equilibrium allocation \(c(t, P_t(\omega), m_t)\) as a function of time, agent indices, and moneyholdings. In the direct mechanism, I claim that the following is a PPE.

In any match, all agents in the match choose the same feasible allocation \(c(t, P_t(\omega), m_t)\); agent \(\omega\) chooses some element of \(\{y^\text{aut}_t\} + Y^\text{aut}_t\) that delivers momentary utility equal to \(u^\text{aut}_t\).

Suppose some agent \(\omega\) chooses a different action in some match. Then, he gets momentary utility less than or equal to \(u^\text{aut}_t\), and the continuation utility associated with having \(m_t^\text{aut}\) units of money. The latter is the same as in the original PPE, because, along the equilibrium path, agents are getting the same allocation of resources. But agent \(\omega\) could have achieved this combination of momentary and future utility in any no-commitment trading mechanism by choosing the right sequence of actions.

(iii) Memory
Consider a PPE in some trading mechanism and agent strategies in the direct mechanism that work as follows. Suppose allocations in every previous match involving agents in \(Q_t(\omega)\) are the same as they would be if agents used the equilibrium strategies from this PPE. Then, agents choose the equilibrium allocation that the original PPE specifies for the match. If not, they choose autarky. This collection of strategies guarantees that if any individual deviates, he gets autarky currently and forever; this is clearly no better than his utility level in the original PPE.

In an environment without a technology of enforcement, it is only possible to implement allocations that are equilibria of no-commitment
trading mechanisms. Proposition 1 then justifies the following definition of incentive-feasible allocations (see Myerson [8] for a similar use of language).

**Definition 6.** An incentive-feasible allocation of the $K$ perishable goods is one that occurs when all agents always play the strategies of a perfect public equilibrium in the direct no-commitment mechanism.

Let me sum up. In a no-commitment trading mechanism, an agent is always free to choose a consumption vector that he is able to produce on his own. The perfect public equilibrium concept provides a rigorous notion of what outcomes are possible given that agents play according to the rules of a given trading mechanism. Proposition 1 then shows that the set of PPE allocations for any mechanism is a subset of PPE allocations for the direct mechanism; hence, I term incentive-feasible the set of PPE allocations when agents use the direct mechanism, and I think of incentive-feasible allocations as being an exhaustive description of the allocations that the members of a society can achieve in the absence of commitment.

**IV. MONEY IS NO BETTER THAN MEMORY**

In this section, I present the main result of the paper, I discuss some related examples, and examine the robustness of the main proposition.

1. **Main Result**

Without commitment, either money or memory is necessary to allow society to achieve allocations that are better than autarky. Because agents cannot keep track of the past, without commitment, only nonautarkic allocations that offer static gains to trade are incentive-feasible. If the matching process satisfies (A1), no such allocations exist.

It is certainly possible to write down examples of environments such that neither money nor memory expand the set of incentive-feasible allocations. For example, in a finite horizon environment, only autarky is incentive-feasible, regardless of whether money or memory is present. However, there are certainly (well-known) examples of environments in which either money or memory does expand the set of allocations. The main proposition shows that the set of incentive-feasible allocations in an environment with memory is always a superset of the set of incentive-feasible allocations in the same environment with money.
Proposition 2. Any incentive-feasible allocation in an environment with money is an incentive-feasible allocation (of the $K$ perishable goods) in the same environment with memory.

Proof. Consider an incentive-feasible allocation in an environment with money. It is the outcome of some PPE when agents use the direct mechanism. In that equilibrium, an agent’s action in any match is a function of the identities of the other agents in the match, and the moneyholdings of all the agents in the match.

Now consider the same environment with memory. For now, suppose that at each date $t$, every agent $\omega$ is characterized by a summary statistic $Z_t(\omega)$. Later, I will argue that this summary statistic is redundant, given the information available in the historical record. Define $Z_t(\omega) \equiv m_t(\omega)$ for all $\omega$ in $\Omega$, so that in the environment with memory, every agent alive at the beginning of period one has a summary statistic equal to his moneyholdings.

Define a match’s history to be the past actions of all agents in $Q_t(\omega)$. The following describes a response function for agents who play the direct mechanism in the environment with memory.

In a match, each individual chooses the same split of the $K$ perishable goods as he would in the money PPE, given the identities of the agents in his match, and treating the summary statistics of the agents in the match as equivalent to their moneyholdings. After the match, individual summary statistics are updated to be equal to the moneyholdings that would occur after the match in the allocation in the environment with money.

Given this definition of response functions, I claim that the following is an equilibrium collection of strategies. Recall that in the direct mechanism, an action is a choice of a feasible allocation and an autarkic consumption vector. Agents use the above response functions in determining the choice of the feasible allocation if the match’s history is consistent with all agents in $Q_t(\omega)$ having always used the above response functions in the past. If the match’s history is inconsistent with all agents in $Q_t(\omega)$ having always used the above response functions in the past, then all agents choose an allocation that delivers current utility $u_{\text{aut},t}$ to each agent $\omega$ in the match.

It is clear that the allocation in the environment with money is the outcome of agents’ playing these strategies in the environment with memory. The question remains whether these strategies are actually an equilibrium. Note first that the summary statistics are complicated functions of the history of past actions of all agents in $Q_t(\omega)$ and the initial moneyholdings of the agents in $\Omega_0$. It follows that agents don’t actually have to see the summary statistics; the strategies are informationally feasible, assuming that in each match agents have memory. Next, I need to
show that at any information set, all agents receive at least as much utility from the PPE allocation in the environment with money as from any autarkic allocation. But this is trivial, because agents could always choose moneyholdings equal to zero and an autarkic consumption vector, and because agents have the same information about future matches in the environment with memory as they do in the environment with money.

2. Examples

Proposition 2 says only that the set of incentive-feasible allocations in an environment with money is included in the set of incentive-feasible allocations with memory. Is the inclusion strict? The following examples show that the answer to this question is negative in the overlapping generations setting set forth in Section II.2, and positive in the random matching environment described in that same subsection.

Example 1. The Equivalence of Money and Memory in an OG Environment.

Consider the overlapping generations environment described in Section II.2.a. Suppose each of the initial old agents have 1 token of money. I claim that an allocation is incentive-feasible in this environment with money if and only if it gives \((c_y^t, c_o^t, t+1)\) to each agent \(j\) where

\[
\begin{align*}
    u(c_y^t, c_o^t, t+1) &\geq u(y_1, y_2) \\
    c_y^t &\geq 0, \ c_o^t \geq y_2 \\
    c_y^t + c_o^t &\leq y_1 + y_2.
\end{align*}
\]

To see this, suppose that agents use the following collection of strategies in the direct mechanism:

If old agent \(j\) has 1 unit of money, young agent \(j\) and old agent \(j\) write down the above allocation.

If old agent \(j\) has \(\varepsilon\) units of money (\(\varepsilon < 1\)), young agent \(j\) and old agent \(j\) write down autarky.

Note that given the conditions on the allocation, these strategies specify best responses. This shows that any allocation in (1) is incentive-feasible. But since any agent can always choose autarky, there are no other incentive-feasible allocations.

In the overlapping generations environment with memory, the set of incentive-feasible allocations is exactly the same as in the environment with money. Consider any allocation in (1); the following strategies implement it. If all previous agents labelled \(j\) have gone along with the allocation, then
the current pair also go along with it. If any agent $j$ has failed to go along with the allocation in the past, then the current pair fails to along with it. Again, because of the restrictions built into (1), these strategies specify best responses in every match, so any allocation in (1) is incentive-feasible in the environment with memory. Thus, in the overlapping generations setting, an even stronger result than Proposition 2 is true: money is technologically equivalent to memory.

This stronger result is also true in the turnpike environment described in Section II.2.b.

**Example 2.** The Superiority of Memory in Random Matching Environments.

Consider instead the Trejos-Wright [15] random matching environment described in Section II.2.c. In that setting, if full commitment were possible, the efficient allocation would involve type $(i + 1)$ agents giving type $i$ agents $y^*$ units of output whenever they are paired, where $y^*$ satisfies $u'(y^*) = 1$. Using a standard folk theorem argument, it is clear that if $\beta$ is sufficiently large, this allocation is incentive-feasible in an environment with memory (see Aiyagari and Wallace [2]).

However, the allocation delivers the same *ex ante* utility after every match. Such an allocation cannot be incentive-feasible in the same environment with money: agents who produce must be offered an increase in future utility relative to those who were similarly situated prior to the meetings but who did not produce.\(^5\) Hence, in the Trejos-Wright [15] model, memory dominates money (at least for large enough values of $\beta$).

3. **Robustness of the Main Result**

It is useful to understand how robust Proposition 2 is. First, note that its proof does not rely on the restriction (A1) that there are no static gains to trade. The only use of this restriction is to make the role of money and memory more dramatic when there is no commitment.

The two other major restrictions on the matching process are (A2) and the independence of $s_t$ from its past. Note that the very definition of perfect public equilibria uses these properties heavily. For this reason, a major reworking of the theory is probably necessary to understand the relative roles of memory and money in environments in which these restrictions on the matching process are not satisfied.

Williamson and Wright [16] and Huggett and Krasa [5] discuss aspects of monetary exchange in environments in which agents are asymmetrically informed about goods quality. I conjecture that Proposition 2

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\(^5\) I thank Neil Wallace for this argument.
in this paper can be extended to environments in which asymmetries of information are transitory—that is, environments in which only perishable goods can be lemons, or in which agents have privately observable endowment and/or preference shocks that are i.i.d. over time. Intuitively, the transience of the information differences means that agents’ beliefs about this information are not altered by having memory (seeing the past actions of their current trading partners) as opposed to money. However, with persistent asymmetries of information, as when agents can produce durable lemons, I believe that it is only possible to prove a version of Proposition 2 by changing the definition of memory.6

Throughout the paper, money is modelled as intrinsically useless. Suppose money were instead a perfectly durable good that entered preferences separably from the $K$ perishable goods and provided some small amount of utility when consumed. Then, it is possible to extend Proposition 2 so that any incentive-feasible allocation of perishable goods in an environment with money is also incentive-feasible in the same environment with memory.

Proposition 2 defines memory as being the past actions of all agents in $Q_t(\omega)$. It is tempting to think that this much memory isn’t necessary: what happens if agents know only the past transfers of resources made and received by all agents in their current match (i.e., $P_t(\omega)$)? It is important to note that in the environment with memory, each individual’s imaginary balance sheet does not just depend on his own transfers; in particular, the maker of a transfer of resources does not see an increase in his balance if the receiver’s balance was zero. For this reason, the entry on any person’s balance sheet is a function not just of his actions, but also those of his trading partners, their trading partners, and so on. Thus, if it is to replicate the benefits of money, memory must include the past actions of all agents in $Q_t(\omega)$, not just in $P_t(\omega)$.

On the other hand, the proof of Proposition 2 also relies on memory’s being limited: Agent $\omega$ only has access to the histories of agents in $Q_t(\omega)$, and not to the histories of all agents. The following example shows that with the latter, more expansive, version of memory, some incentive-feasible allocations in the environment with money may no longer be incentive-feasible in the environment with memory.

Example 3. The environment is an overlapping generations setup in which agents all live four periods. In each cohort, there is a continuum of agents, indexed by $[0, 1]$. (Four cohorts are alive in period one.) Except for one cohort, all agents have the same utility function

$$-y_1 - y_2 - y_3 + \alpha(c_4)$$

6 I thank Ned Prescott and Chris Phelan for stressing this point to me.
where $y_i$ is the amount of output produced in period $i$ of life and $c_{4i}$ is the amount of consumption in the last period of life. (Agents can only produce output in the first three periods of life.) One cohort, born at date $t$, is exceptional. Agents in that cohort have a utility function of the form

$$- y_1 + u(c_2)$$

so they like consumption in their second period of life; they can only produce output in the first period of life.

The matching process works as follows. In each period, the youngest cohort is matched randomly with the old cohort. The two middle cohorts are matched deterministically: The agents labelled $\omega$ are matched with one another. Note that this process satisfies (A1) and (A2).

The set of individually feasible moneyholdings is $I \equiv \{0, 1\}$. Suppose the agents in each cohort are indexed by the set $\{0, 1\}$. Then, the agents indexed by $\omega \in \{0, 1/2\}$ in the three initial oldest cohorts are each endowed with one unit of money. The initial youngest cohort is endowed with zero units of money.

Suppose $y^*$ and $y^{**}$ satisfy the inequalities

$$- y^* + u(y^*) \geq 0$$

$$- y^* + u(y^{**})/2 \geq 0$$

$$- y^* + u(y^*) \geq 0.5 \{ - y^{**} + u(y^*) \}$$

$$- y^{**} + u(y^*) \geq 0.$$

(For example, if $u(x) = x^{1/4}$, then $y^* = 0.15$ and $y^{**} = 0.05$ satisfy these inequalities.) Then, the following is an incentive-feasible allocation in this environment with money. In every period, if an agent in the oldest cohort has a unit of money, the young agent in his match gives him $y^*$ units of output for that unit of money. In period $(t+1)$, in any match in which the agent born in period $t$ has money and the agent born in period $(t-1)$ does not, the agent born in period $(t-1)$ will produce $y^{**}$ units of output in exchange for the unit of money.

The first inequality guarantees that all agents, except those born in period $t$ or in period $(t-1)$, follow the equilibrium strategies when young. The second inequality guarantees that an agent born in period $t$ follows the equilibrium strategy when young; his future utility is divided by two because he has a probability of $1/2$ of meeting someone next period who already has money and so will not accept his money. The third inequality guarantees that in period $(t-1)$, agents born in period $(t-1)$ will buy the money from those old agents who have it rather than wait to buy money from the agent born in period $t$—if he has it! The final inequality
guarantees that in period \((t+1)\), agents born in period \((t-1)\) without money will accept it from agents born in period \(t\) who have it.

Now suppose the typical agent \(\omega\) has memory of the past events in the lives of all agents, not just those agents in \(Q_t(\omega)\). Then, the above allocation is no longer incentive-feasible. Given this kind of memory, in period \(t\), the youngest cohort sees the results of all matches in period \((t-1)\). This means that instead of all of the youngest cohort thinking that there is a probability \(1/2\) of their trading partner next period not producing, half of the youngest cohort knows that they will be matched with someone who will not produce next period. As a consequence, half of the youngest cohort in period \(t\) refuses to produce \(y^*\) units of output for the oldest cohort.

V. CONCLUSIONS

In this paper, I ask the question, “Is there a simple, easily described, technology that is equivalent to money?” I answer this question by showing that in a large class of environments, the set of allocations that are incentive-feasible with memory are a superset of those that are incentive-feasible with money. Hence, the paper has the following message: Money is technologically equivalent to a primitive version of memory.

But this message is clearly not the last word. The words “primitive version” are too vague, and must be made more precise. More technically, this paper proves that the set of incentive-feasible allocations with memory provides an upper bound for the set of incentive-feasible allocations with money. Can we find a simply described technology that generates a smaller upper bound? More ambitiously, can we find the smallest such upper bound?

Despite this limitation of the analysis, I believe that this paper represents an advance over the usual justifications for the existence of money: Money is a store of value, money is a medium of exchange and/or money is a unit of account. These phrases are certainly useful descriptions of money’s role in equilibrium. However, they are misleading when taken as descriptions of the technological function of money. After all, money does not allow society to transfer resources over time. Money does not reduce the cost of transferring resources from one person to another. There is no immediate technological reason why money should be a better numeraire than other goods. An important conclusion of this paper is that “Money is memory” is a much more revealing and accurate description of money’s effect on economic primitives (preferences, information, and technology) than these other, more common, descriptions.
In this paper, money and memory are studied in isolation from one another. In the real world, money and memory co-exist. Kocherlakota and Wallace [6] examine a particular setting in which society has access to both money and memory that is updated only infrequently. We show that if money is restricted in this way, it may be optimal for such a society to use both memory and money in allocating resources among agents.

REFERENCES